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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STRATFORD L. WENDELBOE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
...,--vs.-

Case No.

RICHARD B. JACOBSON, BILLY
JOE LANG, and JOHN H.
DOUGLAS,

9025

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

INTRODUCTION
In his brief the plaintiff purports to give a statement
of the case and a statement of the facts, but in so doing
plaintiff completely overlooks one cardinal and fundamental principle that has been so firmly and repeatedly
stated by this Court as to require no citation. That principle is that the jury by determining the issues in favor
of defendants has found the facts of the incident to be as
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the evidence of the defendants discloses them. The plaintiff repeatedly in his purported statement of the case
and statement of the facts relies on statements of the
plaintiff, statements of the defendants taken completely
out of context, and in several instances, as we will point
out later, on a misstatement of the record.
The fact versions of what occurred in the early morning hours of April 6 that gave rise to this lawsuit were
bitterly contested by the parties, and the defendants'
version as against the plaintiff's version of what really
occurred conflicted at nearly every material point. The
facts, of course, a.re vital in this case. It is impossible
to apply any of the law of arrest or false imprisonment
or malicious prosecution to this case without accurately
ascertaining just what the facts of the incident were. It
is because the facts are of such vital importance in this
matter that defendants believe that this Court cannot
possibly give just consideration to this appeal unless
those facts are set out accurately and in detail and \'lrith
genuine references to the record. Therefore, respondents
shall set forth the facts as they actually occurred and
as they were found to have occurred by the jury in this
case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Fron1 approximately l\{arch 15 to and including April
6, 1958, Salt Lake City had been undergoing a crime wave
(R. 402). Chief Skousen of the Salt Lake City police
force testified that there was an area in downtown Salt
Lake in which there w·as and had been a particularly
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heavy concentration of crimes committed. The locality
of Fifth East and Second South Streets in Salt Lake City
was in the heart of this area (R. 401). On the night of
April 5 and the early morning hours of April 6, 1958,
there was a special police car assigned to this area. The
defendant officer Richard B. Jacobson was the senior
officer in charge of this car. Chief Skousen further testified that from 11 o'clock at night until around 4 or 5
o'clock in the morning is the time of night that the most
serious types of crimes are committed and that he had
given special instructions to be transmitted to the officers
patrolling this area to very carefully check the area and
ordered that every suspicious situation must be completely checked out (R. 403), and Officer Jacobson was informed of these instructions (R. 438).
This was the general situation that confronted the
police officers as they commenced their patrol work and
duties on the night of April 5 and during the early morning hours of April 6, 1958.
At approximately 3 o'clock A.M. on the morning
of April 6, the three defendant officers in the performance of their duties were approaching in their police car
the intersection of Second South and Fifth East. The
police officers were driving from the south to the north
(R. 251). As they approached Second South while driving
north on Fifth East, the officers noticed an old automobile parked on the west side of Fifth East heading in a
southerly direction approximately 70 feet south of the
intersection (R. 251-253, 310). At that time, on the south-
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west corner of the Second South and Fifth East intersection there was a service station under construction, and
there was a construction shed full of tools, equipment, etc.
near the place where the automobile was parked (R.
435). As the officers drove by, they noticed that the
lights of the automobile were out and that the engine was
running (R. 317, 419). After first observing the automobile, the officers continued on across Second South driving in a northerly direction and proceeded to check out a
service station and other buildings in the area, and then
they checked out the Grand Central Store located west of
Fifth East on the south side of Second South. They then
drove out the back and south end of the Grand Central
Parking Lot on to Fifth East again and turned back to
the north.
At this time, they noticed that the automobile was
still parked in the position observed a few minutes before (R. 316-317). They then drove up to the parked car
and parked the police car parallel to the automobile and
a few feet east of it so that the police car was heading
north and the plaintiff's automobile was heading south.
Officer Jacobson thereupon got out of the police car and
went over to the parked car and observed the plaintiff
was sitting at the wheel and that the motor was indeed
running and that there were no keys in the ignition lock
(R. 317). Officer Jacobson then asked in a courteous
manner the occupant, who was the plaintiff, for identification or a driver's license. Plaintiff said absolutely
nothing. He produced a temporary driving permit and
handed it to Offirer Jacobson (R. 254-258). Officer Jacob-
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5
son looked at the temporary permit and since he did not
consider it reliable identification because there was
nothing on it but a name and address and no physical
description of the bearer (R. 412), he asked for additional
identification and the registration certificate for the car.
At this time Officer Jacobson noticed that there was no
registration certificate on the steering column of the car
or elsewhere (R. 436). Plaintiff thereupon pulled a
large stack of cards and other papers from a wallet and
began thumbing through them. As he did so Officer J acobson noticed the corner of what he recognized as an army
identification card because of its pinkish border. He
stated to the plaintiff that the army identification card
would be excellent identification. Thereupon the plaintiff,
still without saying a word, deliberately flipped by the
army identification card (R. 256, 311, 312). This rather
unusual conduct began to alert the further suspicions of
Officer Jacobson, and he thereupon asked the plaintiff
to step outside the automobile because he thought perhaps
it might be someone else's army identification card or
that plaintiff had made an obvious attempt to cover it
up, and Officer Jacobson did not know who he was (R.
312).
Officer Jacobson at this point then asked the Plain-

tiff W endelboe what he was doing there at that time of
morning and what his business was, and plaintiff thereupon replied, "That it was none of your damn business.
That he was a citizen, and he had his rights,'' (R. 257,
329, 354). Officer Jacobson thereupon continued to ask
plaintiff for his identification and stated that they
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definitely wanted that identification and that they definitely wanted to know what plaintiff was doing (R. 258).
Thereupon Officer Jacobson asked plaintiff to be seated
in the rear seat of the police car. But first the officers
directed the plaintiff to place his hands on top of the
police car, and Officer Jacobson quickly patted plaintiff
down as a preliminary precaution against weapons (R.
323). Plaintiff was not searched at this time, and the
patting down was only for the purpose of determining
whether the person had a weapon before placing him in
the back seat of the police car (R. 378). Once in the police
car, Officer Jacobson sat down in the front seat and told
plaintiff he was either going to identify himself with the
car and produce the registration certificate or he was
going to jail (R. 267, 320). Plaintiff just sat in the seat
of the car and said and did absolutely nothing. Thereupon Officer Jacobson informed plaintiff that he was
under arrest for failing to produce that identification and
that registration of that car and told him that if he didn't
bring it out he was going to jail (R. 324). He also told
plaintiff that he could be arrested for vagrancy (R. 313,
316, and 324).
When the plaintiff still refused to answer or to say a
single word, Officer Jacobson put in a call to the dispatcher to impound the car (R. 269), and plaintiff still
said nothing.
Officer Jacobson and Reserve Trainee Douglas then
went over to the parked autmnobile and began to
examine it. Officer Jacobson becan1e aware of a commo-
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tion behind him and turned around and saw that plaintiff
was trying to get out of the police car, and Officer Lang
was holding him in (R. 271). Officer Jacobson told Lang
to let him out and that perhaps now he would tell them
what he was doing there and who he was. At this time
Officers Jacobson and Douglas were standing by the side
of plaintiff's car. As Officer Lang released the door of
the police car, plaintiff came directly out of the police
car at a high rate of speed and knocked both officers aside
(R. 318). He forcibly pushed Officer Jacobson aside with
a movement of his arm across Officer Jacobson's chest
(R. 273, 334, and 339). This conduct, of course, amounted
to an obvious battery by the plaintiff on the person of
Officer Jacobson. At this point Officer Lang caught one
arm 3:nd Officer Jacobson the other arm of the plaintiff
and started him back toward the police car (R. 274). The
plaintiff then attempted to break away from the officers
and a scuffle ensued. Plaintiff had one arm loose swinging it around and at that point Officer Jacobson struck
the plaintiff on the chin in an effort to bring him under
control. This blow had no effect whatever on the plaintiff and seemed to rile him more and resulted in increased
efforts of the plaintiff to break from the custody of the
officers (R. 276). Reserve Officer Douglas was not participating in the struggle at all (R. 277), and never took
any affirmative action against plaintiff.
Officers Lang and Jacobson managed to get ahold
of plaintiff again and Officer Jacobson was able to snap
a handcuff on one wrist (R. 278). The plaintiff got the
arm and wrist free and began wildly flailing his arm
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about, and at that point Officer Jacobson was cut by the
loose handcuff quite a little bit (R. 463). It was at thi~
point and not before that Officer Lang hit plaintiff with
his flashlight. The Officer hit the plaintiff a maximum
of two or three times (R. 335, 364, 365). These blows
with the flashlight were not hard or anywhere near as
hard as Officer Lang could hit, and he had no intention
to injure the plaintiff only get him under control (R. 380).
It is perfectly obvious that these blows with the flashlight were of no severity at all, and the best possible proof
I
of this fact is the photographs "Exhibits 2, 3, and 6" introduced by the plaintiff at the trial and which photographs clearly illustrate the minor, superficial nature of
the contact from the flashlight. At this point in the
scuffle, Officer Jacobson managed to get behind the plaintiff and apply a perfectly harmless and effective hold
with his arm underneath the plaintiff's chin, which hold
renders a person off balance and momentarily cuts off
the blood supply to the head making him groggy. As
Officer Jacobson applied the hold to the plaintiff, the
officer was able to snap the other handcuff on to plaintiff's other hand, and at that point all physical activity
of the officers toward plaintiff ceased (R. 381), and plaintiff was lowered to the ground, and except for a 1noment
of dizziness, the plaintiff fron1 this point on during the
entire evening was c01npletel~,. conscious and observant of
everything that was going on around hiln although from
that time on during the evening the plaintiff faked unconsciousness and injury as it suited his convenience (R.
290, 387).
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A police ambulance within a moment or two appeared
on the scene. Plaintiff was examined and pronounced
not injured, and because he refused to walk or talk because he didn't want to (R. 126), the officers picked him
up and placed him on the rear seat of the police car. From
I
this point on through the entire evening, plaintiff never
would walk or stand up, requiring the officers to lift and
carry him about from place to place as will be seen. Upon
arriving at the jail, the officers decided to take plaintiff
to the County Hospital for examination (R. 284-286). At
the hospital Officer Jacobson requested a blood alcohol
test in order to determine if plaintiff was drunk, since
he was at a loss to account for plaintiff's actions (R. 288
et. seq.). Officer Jacobson then left the plaintiff at the
County Hospital and went up to the Latter-day Saints
Hospital to have his hand examined which had been injured in his scuffle with the plaintiff.
Other officers rehandcuffed the plaintiff at the
County Hospital and returned him to the City Jail for
booking. At the time of the booking, Officers Jacobson,
Lang, and Douglas had returned from the Latter-day
Saints Hospital and were present.
From the time that the handcuffs were placed on
plaintiff at the scene until he was returned to the City
Jail for booking, he intermittently faked unconsciousness and only aroused himself to swear at the officers
(R. 290). Plaintiff again required the officers to carry
him into the jail by the booking pen, and he refused to
stand or talk, so he was laid down on the floor (R. 291, et.
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seq.). At this point, the custody of the plaintiff was
turned over from the arresting officers to the booking
officers and jailer. The officer in charge was Harvey
Roach assisted by Larry D. Lunnen, and these officers
made the decision and determined what was to be done
with plaintiff from that point on (R. 426).
Plaintiff refused to give the booking officers any information at all. He refused to state his name, and he
refused to get up; he just stubbornly lay on the floor,
although he was not really injured at all. The only thing
he did at the jail was to call for newspapermen, lawyers,
etc. (R. 291).
Because of several attempts at suicide in the City
Jail, Chief Skousen had given express instructions (R.
405) to the jailers, which instructions were in effect April
6, 1958, that any individual who was behaving in an abnormal manner or appeared to be mentally depressed
must be stripped of his clothing and placed in an isolation
cell so that he would not injure hin1self. The determination to follow this procedure ·with plaintiff \Yas decided
upon by Officers Roach and Lunnen and no one else (R.
426), although the defendants helped to carry plaintiff
downstairs to the cell when he still refused to walk (R.
295), and Officer Jacobson assisted Officer Roach somewhat in removing clothes although Officer Roach removed most the clothing, and Officer Roach also filled
· out the booking sheet listing the plaintiff as J olm Doe
(R. 427). By this tin1e it was approximately 6 o'clock
A.M. (R. 217). Approximately 2lh hours later, Officer
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Merrill, after having previously offered breakfast to the
plaintiff, returned to his cell to obtain information for
the booking sheet, and he at that time asked plaintiff if
he wanted an attorney and was given telephone numbers
by the plaintiff which he called (R. 421, ':!:22).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS SET FORTH IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF DISCLOSES NO MER.TT THERETO
AND A COMPLETE MISICONCEPTION OF 'THE FACTS AND
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, AND PLAINTIFF
WAS LEGALLY ARRESTED BY DEFENDANTS AFTER AND
ONLY AFTER HE HAD COMMIT'TED NOT ONLY ONE BUT
SEVERAL MISDEMEANORS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE
OFFICERS.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF DID NOT RECEIVE A SEVERE BEATING
OR ANYTHING APPROACHING IT AND WAS ONLY SUPERFICIALLY INJURED IN THE LAWFUL EFFORTS OF THE
DEFENDANT OFFICERS TO RETAIN HIM IN CUSTODY.
POINT III
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 'THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALI,CIOUS PROSECUTION SHOULD NOT LIE
AGAINST 'THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE, AND IN ANY
EVENT, THE FAICTS AND EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS AT THE TRIAL CLEARLY ES'TABLISHED A
DE'FENSE TO ANY SUCH CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT ERRONEOUS.
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 'THE DEFENDANTS IS NOT SUFFICIEN'T UNDER 'THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AND IN VIEW OF THE APPLICABLE LAW
APPLIED BY THE COURT BELOW.
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POINT V
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO RESERVE OFFICER DOUGLAS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS SET FORTH IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF DISCLOSES NO MERI'T THERETO
AND A COMPLETE MISCONCEPTION OF THE FACTS AND
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO TI-llS CASE, AND PLAINTIFF
WAS LEGALLY ARRESTED BY DEFENDANTS AFTER AND
ONLY AFTER HE HAD COMMITTED NOT ONLY ONE BUT
SEVERAL MISDEMEANORS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE
OFFICERS.

Plaintiff's brief sets forth nine points which we will
now briefly discuss in the order in which those points
are presented in the plaintiff's and appellant's brief.
Plaintiff's Point I
Plaintiff claims in this point that there is little dispute as to the actual facts concerning the false arrest and
imprisonment count. An examination of the facts set
forth above show that this is not so.
At the trial, plaintiff insistently attempted to put
over the false notion that for son1e reason the Defendant
Reserve Trainee Douglas was being instructed in how to
perform arrests and that plaintiff was badly treated for
the special benefit of Defendant Douglas. Nothing could
he further from the truth. The Defendant Douglas was
not an inexperienced recruit or anything like it. He had
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completely finished his schooling as a reserve officer and
had been graduated from his class March 25, 1958 (R.
325), although he was not actually sworn in as a reserve
officer until April 16, 1958. Defendant Officer Lang
expressly testified that they were not trying to give Douglas any lessons (R. 362) and that he was just along on a
routine evening of police work. Officer Jacobson testified
that Defendant Douglas had been along with him on
many occasions (R. 410), and the attempt by plaintiff
both at trial and in his brief to imply that there was any
improper conduct for the benefit of Douglas is totally
unwarranted.
Plaintiff states at Page 34 of his brief that he was
not resentful and was willing to comply. As a matter of
truth, from the very first time that the officers approached plaintiff in the lawful exercise of their duties, plaintiff
was belligerent, surly, and interfered with their lawful inquiries as to what he was doing there and everything
he did delayed and obstructed them (R. 379).
Plaintiff in his brief repeatedly states that he was
forced to put his hands on top of the police car and was
searched when such is not the fact. The truth of the matter is that before plaintiff was requested to sit in the back
seat of the police car, he was briefly and quickly patted
down for the purpose of seeing whether or not he was
carrying any weapons (R. 323). Certainly there is nothing illegal about this procedure, and in view of the fact
that a police officer in circumstances such as existed here
can expect almost anything, common sense would dictate
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that police officers exercise this elementary caution.
There is absolutely no truth to the claim on Page 36 of
plaintiff's brief that when plaintiff left the police car all
he wanted to do was talk to the officers and try to convince them not to impound his car. The jury has found,
as set forth in the statement of facts above, that the truth
of the matter is that the plaintiff burst out of the police
car at a high rate of speed and knocked against both
Officers Jacobson and Lang in an apparent attempt to
get in his car or to leave the area (R. 318).
Defendants do not dispute that an arrest for a misdemeanor can ·only be made upon a warrant or for an
offense committed in the presence of the arresting officer.
Certainly this is a correct statement of the law, and these
defendant officers were fully aware of that fact. By
attempting to insist over and over again that he was falsely arrested, plaintiff merely begs the question. The facts
are that he conrmitted several offenses directly in the
presence of the officers and when he was placed under
arrest in the rear seat of the police car he was specifically
informed by Officer Jacobson that he was being placed
under arrest and what for (R. 417).
The two prin1ary offenses, besides the assault and
battery upon the officers, and the attempted escape, were
plaintiff's wilfull failure and refusal to display a registration card and resisting and obstructing the officers.
Plaintiff repeated})~ failed and refused to produce
the registration certificate to the defendant officers after
the smne had been requested frmn hin1 and de1nanded
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from him. Section 41-1-40 of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, provides that the registration card shall at all times
be carried either in the vehicle or upon the person driving
or in control of such vehicle, uwho shall dvsplay the same
upon demand of a police officer or any officer or employee
of the department." Section 41-1-142(K), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, makes it a misdemeanor for any person
to violate the provisions of the aforementioned section.
The city ordinances follow the statute identically. The record shows without question that Officer Jacobson repeatedly requested and demanded this registration certificate
in connection with his overall attempt to ascertain plaintiff's connection with the automobile, and plaintiff
persistently refused and failed to produce the same. In
fact when he was finally arrested in the back seat of the
police car, he still said absolutely nothing when Officer
Jacobson told him that he was being placed under arrest
for refusing to display the registration certificate, to
identify himself, and refusing to give a legitimate business for being there at that time of night (R. 320, 417).
At every point in the proceedings, the plaintiff obviously wilfully resisted, delayed, and obstructed Officer
Jacobson in violation of Section 76-28-54 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This point will be discussed later in connection with plaintiff's Point II.
The Revised Ordinances, 1955, Salt Lake City, Utah,
Section 32-1-52 define vagrancy. Sub-section 5 thereof
states that every idle person is a vagrant and Section 6
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thereunder provides that every person who wanders
about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night
without any visible or lawful business is a vagrant. It
seems perfectly apparent that the officers had every
right and duty to determine whether or not plaintiff was
indeed idle upon the streets of Salt Lake City without
any visible or lawful business, for he certainly appeared
to be. Whether or not he actually was a vagrant is a
little beside the point because the only way a police
officer could tell whether or not a person had a lawful
business or was idle would be to ask him and without
becoming involved in the question of whether or not the
plaintiff was under a duty to answer such a question, it
certainly seems apparent that he had no right to reply
that it was "None of the officers damn business." Perhaps the plaintiff might have said, "I stand on Constitutional grounds and refuse to answer," but he did not,
and as we shall point out later, by his action and in his
state1nents he obstructed and delayed Officer Jacobson
in the exercise of what certainly was the officer's legitimate duty, namely to ascertain what business the plaintiff was up to at that late hour of the night in the
f'xtremel~· unusual and suspicious circumstances of sittin~ in a parked autonwbile with the lights out, the motor
running-, no ke~·s in the ignition, and right next to a cons1 ruction shed at the scene (R. 317, -±:15). If the plaintiff
l1ad ntad(\ <'YPn the slightest effort to produce the registration to the nutmnobile as he was under a duty to do,
quite probably the entire incident would have ended here,
and the plain tiff could have gone on his way. But the
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plaintiff admitted himself (R. 197, 198) that he never even
told the officer that he had a registration, that he never
even told him his name, that he never even said I'm an
army officer or a cab driver, and certainly by his own admissions alone and by the positive statements of defendant officers, he clearly committed an offense and misdemeanor in the presence of the officers by failing to produce the registration certificate, and this was not a minor
or technical point. The way the situation was developing,
Officer Jacobson had every reasonable right to begin to
form the belief that perhaps this was a stolen car, and he
certainly would have been derelic~ in his duty if he had
not continued to investigate the situation.
The striking thing about this entire case and incident is the way the whole matter developed point by point
8olely and completely as a result of the defiant and belligerent attitude of the plaintiff and in his total refusal to
produce his registration or say anything about it or state
what he was doing in the area under those highly unusual
circumstances. Therefore, it seems clear beyond any
shadow of a doubt that before any struggle or scuffle
whatever ensued, the Plaintiff W endelboe was under lawful arrest in the back seat of that police car. Indeed, he
himself stated that he submitted to being put in the car
(R. 195) and was confined therein (R. 196), although he

denied the final chance that Officer Jacobson gave him to
produce his registration (R. 417). Certainly in view of
these facts, there was no error in the Court's failure
to grant plaintiff's requested Instruction No.6 to instruct
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the jury that in this connection plaintiff was falsely arrested.
Plaintiff's Point II
Plaintiff maintains that Instruction No. 7 is contrary
to law. It is difficult to understand plaintiff's position
on this Instruction. The Instruction follows the language
identically of Section 41-1-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
which Section clearly requires that a person display and
show the registration certificate to a police officer upon
demand. Whether or not the registration is attached inside the vehicle or upon the person is not of particular importance. The vital point is that a police officer in the
performance of his duty quite often must determine the
connection a person in a vehicle has with the ownership
of such vehicle. There is no need in this case to be concerned with any supposed inconsistency between Section
41-1-40 and Section 41-1-142 in connection ·with the point
as to whether or not the registration must be attached
inside the autonwbile or may be carried on the person,
because the Salt Lake City Ordinance is clear and mandatory. The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1955, in Title 46, designated the "Traffic Code," at Section 179 thereof provide that the registration certificate
"shall at all times be carried in the vehicle to which it refers or shall be carried by the person driving or in control
of such vehicle who shall display the san1e upon demand
of a police officer.''
Plaintiff then further makes the c01nplete misstaternent in Page 42 of his brief that the evidence is uncontra-
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dieted that Mr. Wendelboe did not either fail or refuse to
display his registration certificate. Nothing could be
further from the truth; as we have already seen by appropriate citations to the record, Officer Jacobson
repeatedly requested and demanded that plaintiff display the registration certificate; first when he was still
in his automobile (and even the plaintiff doesn't deny
this) (R. 195, 196), next outside the plaintiff's automobile,
and finally in the back 'seat of the police car before Officer Jacobson stated to the plaintiff that he was under arrest (R. 320, 417), and in this connection note that when
Officer Jacobson talked to Mr. Melvin Morris, the City
Prosecutor, soon after the incident, Mr. Morris testified
that at that time Officer Jacobson told him that plaintiff
had failed to produce the registration (R. 449).
There can be no question at all in this case that the
plaintiff absolutely failed and refused to display his
registration certificate, and from his belligerent and defiant attitude and his refusal to say one word, particularly in the back seat of the police car, it is quite obvious
that, either he had no intention of displaying the same,
or what is more probably the truth, that in fact he had
no registration certificate either on his person or in the
vehicle, because Officer Jacobson never did see the registration certificate at any time (R. 256), and Officer Larry
D. Lunnen who looked through plaintiff's wallet at the jail
did not see or find plaintiff's registration certificate
(R. 427). The omnibus penalty provision, Section 41-1142, (K) thereof clearly makes it a misdemeanor for any
person to violate any of the provisions of this Act, and
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Section 41-1-40 is a provision of the Act referred to.
Plaintiff claims that the Instruction is contrary to
law, argumentative, confusing and tends to comment on
the evidence. 53 American Jurisprudence at Page 475,
Section 602 states as follows:

"* * * it is generally not deemed to be an invasion of the province of the jury for the trial
judge, in his discretion, in charging the jury to
sum up the facts in the case or state the evidence.
Instructions which are in the nature of .a resume of
the evidence and argument do not constitute reversible error unless so unfair to the appellant as
to have prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury."
In this case it was vital because of the nature of
the law of arrest that the jury be able to determine at
what time plaintiff was subject to lawful arrest or in
other words at what point his conduct amounted to an
offense or misdemeanor corrnnitted in the presence of the
arresting officer because there is no dispute whatever
that an officer, or any other person for that matter, arresting without a warrant for a misdemeanor must have
the offense committed in his presence.

State v. A.nselmo, 148 Pac. 1071 (46, Utah 137) decided by this Court in 1915 clearly states the law and the
Court's duties on instructions when the law of arrest is
involved. Under headnotes 5 and 6 at Page 1075 in the
Pacific Reporter this Court states :
"The decisions of the Courts are practically
unanimous that whether an officer "~as authorized
to make an arrest, or whether the arrest was law-
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ful or unlawful, when the facts are not in dispute,
is a question of law for the Court. Where, however, the facts are in dispute and while the question on a given set of facts is still one of law, yet
the jury must find the facts, and the Court charge
them in specific terms under what state of particular facts, when found, an arrest is lawful or otherwise."
This is exactly what the Court did in Instruction No.
7 and also Instruction No. 17 to be discussed later, and it
is submitted that unless instructions are framed this way,
the jury could not possibly determine under contraverted
facts whether or not the arrest was lawful.
Entirely apart from the fact that the plaintiff had
been resisting and obstructing the officers in their lawful
duty to investigrute the unusual and suspicious circumstances of the plaintiff's presence at that time of night in
his automobile parked with the lights off, motor running,
and no keys in the ignition - there can be no dispute
under the facts in this case that the plaintiff clearly failed and refused to display the registration certificate according to the mandate of the statute.
Plaintiff's Point III
Instruction No. 17 to which plaintiff objects is based
upon the following statutes:

10-6-66 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, concerning powers and duties of police officers, and the Salt Lake City
Ordinance which is identical, to wit: Revised Ordinances,
1955, Salt Lake City, 30-1-18.
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Section 76-28-54 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
is the state statute on resisting or obstructing officers.
Section 32-1-31 Revised Ordinances, 1955, Salt Lake
City, Utah, which is the City Ordinance on interfering
with an officer.

State v. Sandman, 4 Utah (2d) 69, 286 Pac. (2d),
1060.
Section 10-6-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the
identical Salt Lake City Ordinance provide that it "shall
be the duty of the police force in any city at all times to
preserve the common peace, prevent crime, detect and
arrest offenders, *** enforce every law relating to the
oppression of offenses, and perform all duties enjoined
upon them by ordinance."
Section 10-6-67 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, says
that police officers "shall have power and authority without process to arrest and take into custody any person
who shall comm1t or threaten or attempt to commit in the
presence of such officer, or within his vision, any breach
of the peace or any offense directly prohibited by th8
laws of this state or by any ordinance.
It will be observed that both these statutes use the
1nandrutory word "shall" have certain duties, etc., in connection with their description of the duties of police officers to prevent and detect crime; and the n1andatory
"shall" further states that police officers shall perform
these duties at all times. Therefore, Instruction No. 17
wherein jt states that police officers and the defendants
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in this case had the positive and absolute duty to investigate any circumstances or situations, etc. does nothing
more than set forth the mandatory direction of the statutes because the duty is positive and absolute and such
duty must be performed at all times.
On the night in question, these police officers were
engaged in performing that part of police work which occupies most of the working hours of any police officer.
The solving of committed crimes and the arresting of persons who are actually committing a crime is but a small
part of the police officer's duties when compared with
the amount of time that he spends patrolling, investigating, detecting, and endeavoring to prevent crime. That is
exactly what these police officers were doing in the early
morning hours of April 6, 1958. They were patrolling a
very bad area in Salt Lake, an area in which there had
been recent outbreaks of serious crimes. To say that the
automobile of the plaintiff parked at 3 A.M. in the morning near a construction tool shed on property under construction, with the lights out, the motor running, and no
keys in the ignition, did not present a situation that these
officers were under an absolute duty to investigate seems
absurd. This automobile was parked in that fashion in a
very bad area crimewise, but suppose the automobile had
been parked anywhere else in Salt Lake City at that time
Of~night under those circumstances-a residential area. for
example-certainly even then it would have been the absolute duty of these police officers to stop and investigate
those circumstances in connection with their mandatory

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
duty to prevent and detect crime and at all times preserve
the public peace. So when the Instruction sets forth that
if the defendants had a reasonable suspicion upon reasonable grounds whatever that plaintiff sitting in the parked
automobile in question as appears from the evidence (and
this part of the evidence is not in dispute or denied even
by plaintiff) might be committing any offense or might be
about to commit any offense, and states that the defendants had the power and the authority and the absolute
duty to approach the plaintiff and ask him what he was
doing at that time and place, said Instruction correctly
states the law. That is the only possible way that the officers could determine whether or not the plaintiff was or
was not idle upon the streets of Salt Lake City at late and
unusual hours of the night without any apparent or lawful business. To argue whether the plaintiff was or was
not a vagrant at that time, more or less begs the question.
A very interesting and pertinent case on this point is one
by the Supreme Court of Washington under a vagrancy
statute identical with the vagrancy statute of the state of
Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah. That decision is:
State v. Grenz, 175 Pac. (2d) 633. The Court states
on Page 637 of the Pacific Reporter the following:
"A continuous or habitual wandering about
the streets at late or unusual hours of the night
is not required to constitute vagrancy as here
charged. The obvious intent of the legislature
in enacting subdivision 8 of the vagrancy statute
was to enable law enforcement officers to keep
the streets clear, at late and unusual hours of the
night, of those persons who, by reason of being
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bent upon serious mischief, theft, or burglary,
have no visible or lawful business or mission in
the locality."
Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 91 at Page 783 states
the following:
"On the other hand, when one's wandering
and conduct on the streets at a late or unusual
hour is such as to give reasonable grounds for the
belief that his purpose in being on the street is
not a legitimate one, the law may validly require
that he be called on to account for his actions and
may deem his failure to give a good account as
proof that his purpose on the street is. not a legitimate one."
The only possible way a police officer could ever determine whether a person apparently idle upon the streets
at late and unusual hours has lawful business is to ask
him, and it seems to us that it is no burden whatsoever
and violates and infringes on no Constitutional right
whatever to require a citizen who might find himself in
such circumstances to decently inform the police officer
just what his business was there at that time and place.
It would be a fine state of affairs if every potential burglar or other person observed upon the streets of Salt
Lake City .at late and unusual hours of the· night under
highly suspicious circumstances could tell the police officer that it was "None of their damn business what they
were doing there." This plaintiff was determined to resist and obstruct and delay these officers in the exercise
of their lawful duties from the very first time that he was
approached by Officer Jacobson. In the first place he
didn't even answer the request of Officer Jacobson for his
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driver's license, merely handed him the temporary permit
(R. 254). In the second place, he deliberately flipped
past the army identification card that Officer Jacobson
had noticed and asked to see (R. 311) without saying a
word. In the third place, he did not produce his registration card, and in the fourth place after Officer Jacobson
directed him to step out of his automobile and asked him
what he was doing there at that time and place, the plaintiff defiantly answered, "It is none of your damn business," (R. 257, 329, and 354). This conduct it is obvious
was wilful. The provisions of 76-28-54 provide as follows:
"Every person who wilfully resists, delays, or
obstructs any public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any duty of his office shall
be punished by a fine of $1,000.00 or by an imprisonment in the County Jail not exceeding one
year or by both."
The plaintiff in those circumstances certainly could
have been a vagrant. Any reasonable person n1ight have
expected him of that, let alone a police officer. He might
have been a lookout assisting son1e other person bent
on mischief .at the service station under construction or
the Grand Central Store next door, and an officer who
is under a positive and m.andatory duty to prevent crime
and detect crime who failed to investigate such a situation would certainly be derelict in his duties in the extreme. The 1949 edition of Y\T ebster's N e\Y Collegiate
Dictionary based on \Y ebster's New International Dictionary Second Edition says that .. detect" 1neans to
uncover or reveal or to discover the existence or presence
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or fact of sOinething hidden or obscure, and if police
officers have a duty to detect crime they certainly have
a right and a positive duty to uncover, reveal, or discover
the existence or presence of any fact which might show
that .a public offense of any kind was being committed
or was about to be committed, and that is exactly what
Instruction No. 17 told the jury. The Instruction does
not give the officers any blank check or "Gestapo" techniques. It very expressly says that }he circumstances
must be reasonably suspicious or unubal or the circumstances must suggest to them a reasonable possibility
that a public offense was being committed before they
can investigate. The claim that this Instruction is contrary to the Bill of Rights and could conceivably be the
orders to a "Gestapo" unit in a police state is completely
ridiculous. In the first place, this jury under the Instruction decided whether or not the officers' investigation was reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
What greater safeguard could any person anywhere
have against "Gestapo" police than a requirement that
a jury of his peers minutely examine every action of
the officers through four full days of trial and then
determine whe,ther the initial investigation itself was
reasonable under the circumstances. Instruction No. 17
does no more than this. The Instruction further states
that no person has any right whatsoever to resist, interfere with, obstruct or delay a police officer, and this
language is taken identically from the statute. The Instruction then states that if such a person wvlfully does
or says anything which resists, interferes with, delays
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or obstructs a police officer in the legal exercise of hi::;
duties then such person is guilty of a crime and a public
offense. We have already seen from the citation to
State vs. Anselmo supra at 148 Pac. 1075, that this type
of an Instruction which sets forth the facts which constitute an offense is proper.
This is not a case where officers took a person into
custody to investigate him. This is not a case where a
person was searched or arrested before any offense was
committed. This is a case wherein the plaintiff placed
himself in highly suspicious and unusual circumstances
late at night and then wilfully obstructed, resisted, and
delayed police officers performing their duty, violated
the registration law, swore at the officers, assaulted
them, and finally ended up in jail where he belonged.
The claim that he stopped to buy a paper seems
completely ridiculous since the evidence is clear that he
was parked some 70 feet south from the place where the
newspaper stand was (R. 253, 310), and also in view of
the fact that he had already bought himself one paper
earlier in the evening (R. 167), and also in view of the
fact that there was a paper stand right outside the door
of the place where he worked (R. 166 et. seq., 169, 221.),
and particularly in view of the fact that he never mentioned the newspaper story according to Officer Jacobson
or anyone else until he was down at the hospital. (R. 434).
At 48 American Law Reports Annotated, Page 74G,
there is a very interesting annotation on what constitutes
the offense of obstructing or resisting an officer. The

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
American Law Reports Blue Book of supplemental decisions discloses that no less than 70 cases have been
decided since the original annotation. Among those cases
cited is the Utah case of State vs. Sandman, 4 Utah (2d)
69, 286 Pac. 1060. Respondents have read every one of
those cases therein cited, and none of those cases is as
pertinent or as clearly reasoned in connection with the
problem here under consideration as the case of State vs.
Sandman decided by this Court in 1955. The Court says
that the elements of resisting and obstructing are as
follows:
A.

A duly constituted public officer.

Of this ele-

ment there can he no question in this case.

B. Eng.aged in the performance of an official duty.
It should certainly be clear beyond doubt that the defendants were engaged in the performance and official duties
in stopping and investigating and looking into the circumstances presented by the plaintiff in his automobile
on Fifth East near Second South on the night in question.
C.

Was obstructed or resisted by the person in

question. Decisions dealing directly with the law applying to an officer when he is investigating and performing
his duty before any crime may have actually been committed are rare, and this is a surprising thing because as
we have seen, most police work, in the point of time
spent at least, involves this very process. This Court in
a clear and far reaching statement of the law cuts through
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much confusion and obscurity on this point and states
simply and clearly as follows:
"Such interference or resistance need not be in the
form of physical force or violence, but it is sufficient
that there be some direct action amounting to affirmative
interference," and this is exactly what Instruction No. 17
informed the jury that they must find against the plaintiff before they could find that he committed an offense
when the Instruction says that if he wilfully resists, interferes with, delays or obstructs a police officer in the
legal exercise of his duties, then such person at that
moment by such statement or conduct itself is guilty of
a crin1e and public offense. On the facts of this case, it
seems clear beyond dispute that the plaintiff was surly,
belligerent, defiant, and obstructed, delayed, and resisted
these officers at every point in the entire incident from
the time they first made the lawful request and inquiry
with respect to his registration and his business there
until the time that he attempted to break from lawful
custody and committed .an assault and battery on the
officers and continuously through the entire evening right
up through the booking process at the jail. There was
no excuse or rhy1ne or reason for the plaintiff's conduct
and affirmative actions and state1nents in this case
unless he was in fact trying to actually cover up some
illegal activity that he was engaged in.
Plaintiff's Point IV
Plaintiff states on Page 51 of his brief that it appears
from the evidence that he was unn1ercifully beaten. This
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statement is so completely untrue that respondents will
discuss the matter under their own Point II at Page 36
in this brief.
Plaintiff further complains of Instruction No. 8 and
insists that the Court should have directed a verdict on
the cause of action for assault and battery for the plaintiff. The entire basis for this argument seems to be the
assumption by plaintiff that he was not lawfully arrested.
Respondents' position on this matter has already been
stated in this brief. If we assume that the plaintiff was
lawfully under arrest in the back seat of the police car
before the altercation ever started, then certainly the
only question left to consider is whether or not plaintiff
attempted to remove himself from this custody and forcibly enter the automobile and leave the area, and if he
did make such an attempt, whether reasonable force
under the circumstances was used by the respondent
officers to prevent him from so doing.
There certainly can be no question from the evidence
in this case that plaintiff came out of the police car at
a high rate of speed and knocked or pushed both officers
aside in an apparent attempt to enter his automobile
and leave the area (R. 273, 334, 339, and 318). There
was nothing the officers could do under the circumstances
except to stop him, and Instruction No. 8 fairly and
adequately informed the jury that the amount of force
and restraint used must be only the degree of force that
the officers believe they had reasonable grounds for
using and that amount of force that appeared necessary
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to these defendants. The first blow struck by Officer
Jacobson was not struck until after both he and Officer
Lang had a hold of each arm of the plaintiff and were
leading him back to the car and the plaintiff broke loose
(R. 275), and this blow was certainly not very severe
because it had no apparent effect on the plaintiff whatsoever and only seemed to rile him more (R. 276). Then
Officer Jacobson managed to get a handcuff on one arm
(R. 278), and plaintiff broke that arm free and in swinging and flailing it about cut Officer Jacobson quite a
little bit (R. 463), and then and only then did Officer
Lang hit him with the flashlight (R. 279). These blows
were not severe or brutal and were not intended to injure
plaintiff (R. 380). The minute both handcuffs were
secured to the plaintiff's arms, all physical activity
against him ceased (R. 381). As we will demonstrate under our own Point II, the plaintiff was not severely injured at all, and the truth of the matter is that these
officers had no intention or design to injure the plaintiff
and actually did a very good job of placing an extremely
violent and powerful man under control without hurting
him.
Plaintiff's Point V
This point in regard to the malicious prosecution
cause of action will be discussed under respondents'
Point III at Page 38 of this brief.
Plaintiff's Point VI

All the defendant officers were expressly charged
with malice and punitive damages were sought. There-
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fore, it certainly was permissible to show what was
actually in their minds and what their frame of mind
was on the night in question. The fact that they were
patrolling an extremely dangerous area and were under
specific instructions to completely check every suspicious
situation (R. 403) certainly would be highly material and
relevant on the question of malice, and, therefore, the
evidence of Chief Skousen in this respect was permissable
and proper in every sense. See also the comments of the
Court below on this point at R. 401.
Plaintiff's Point VII
Throughout the trial plaintiff's attorney persistently
and flagrantly in express violation of repeated rulings
by the trial Court attempted to read from certain records
and reports made by the police officers in connection
with their departmental reports about the incident. The
proper use of these documents as a basis of crossexamination and impeach1nent is not doubted, but they
were not used for that purpose by plaintiff. Plaintiff's
counsel persisted in an attempt to capitalize on
certain grammatical errors or stilted language used in
the reports by the defendants and to ridicule their ability
to write. The conduct of plaintiff's counsel in persisting
in these tactics throughout the trial was clearly improper,
and he was able, in the judgment of attorney for respndents, to successfully convey to the jury the notion that
perhaps there was something in those reports that defendants were trying to hide. Therefore, Officer Jacobson's primary report "Exhibit 20'' and Officer Lang's
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report "Exhibit 22" were admitted by respondents
withdrawing their objections to the previous offerings.
(R. 305, R. 376). It is submitted and perfectly apparent
from all the reports that there is no material variance
whatever in the information given in the officers' reports
from their evidence at the trial.
The booking sheet "Exhibit 23" was simply the booking officers's version of what had been said to him by
defendant officers and in no sense constituted any
statement by them which was admissable for any purpose
in this lawsuit and was properly excluded by the Court.
Exhibits 19 and 21 which were not admitted by the Court,
are merely written reports originally submitted by the
officers as departmental record and do not purport to set
forth the full and complete details of what occurredthey are secondary evidence and were not admissable
under any theory propounded by plaintiff.
A reading of Rule 43 (b) shows that there was no
irregularity in defendants cross-examination by their
own counsel after they had been called by plaintiff. The
rule expressly authorizes such cross-exmnination- and
in any event no unfair advantage was taken of plaintiff.

Plaintiff's Point VIII
Plaintiff complains that the ·Court's conduct was
prejudicial to hin1. Nothing could more clearly illustrate
the belligerent disposition of the plaintiff than his conduct
at his own trial. The truth of the matter is that the
trial judge exhibited patience almost beyond belief before
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he finally was forced to reprimand the plaintiff. The
plaintiff was determined in this case to sound off and
volunteer his own statements regardless of what questions were asked him and regardless of admonitions from
the Court. No less than seventeen times during the
course of the trial it was necessary for the Court to
instruct the plaintiff to stop volunteering answers and
to confine himself to the qeustions asked (R. 112, 114,
119, 123, 128, 129, 134, 135, 138, 139, 141, 143, 169, 170,
202, 210, 211). At R. 143, the plaintiff in a very insolent
tone argued with the Court and told the Court that he
was trying to be helpful. At R. 211 the Court finally
administered the reprimand to the plaintiff that is
complained of in plaintiff's brief. It is impossible to tell
from the printed record exactly what the tone of voice
was that was being used, but the Court's reporter from
the top of R. 211 to the bottom of R .. 211 did a remarkable
job of reporting because what really happened was that
the Court began to reprimand and instruct the plaintiff,
and all the answers as shown at R. 211 by plaintiff were
out and out interruptions of the Court's statements.
The Court was attempting to make a statement
and an instruction and a reprimand to plaintiff, and plaintiff in a rude .and belligerent
fashion kept butting in to
the remarks that the Court was making. Plaintiff was
lucky that he didn't get punished for contempt as a result
of this incident.
'

There is little need to cite extensive authority for
the propsition that the trial Court is certainly entitled,
indeed has a duty, to keep the proceedings in his Court
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orderly and to keep witnesses within proper bounds. The
trial Court was well within his bounds of discretion in
this incident, and the attempt on the part of plaintiff to
now capitalize on his own misbehavior is typical of his
conduct in the entire lawsuit. At 53 American Jurisprudence under the heading TRIAL at Section 74 found
at Page 73 of said volume there is an excellent discussion
relating to the conduct of the judge at trial. Section 81
at Page 79 of said volume deals with the conduct of the
Court toward witnesses. The authorities there discussed
show that without question the Court was entirely justified in his reprimand to the plaintiff. It was not even
necessary for the Court to make the comments to the jury
with respect to the incident that he did at R. 298, 299, but
the trial Court wanted to be completely fair to the plaintiff, and, therefore, made these remarks.
Plaintiff's Point IX
The matter of the defendants' judgment for attorney's fees against the plaintiff will be discussed In
respondents' Point IV at Page 41 of this brief.
POINT II
PLAIN'TIFF DID NOT RECEIVE A SEVERE BEATING
OR ANYTHING APPROACHING IT AND WAS ONLY SUPERFICIALLY IN JURED IN THE LAWFUL EFFORTS OF THE
DEFENDANT OFFICERS TO RETAIN HIM IN CUSTODY.

Dr. Marshall S. Decker, the obstetrician who examined
and treated the plaintiff, testified (R. 183) that he exmnined and treated the plaintiff on the 6th day of April,
1958. He testified that the plaintiff had bruises on the
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shoulders, under the left armpit, over the right loin,
and over the sacroiliac region (R. 184). Plaintiff within
a day or two after the incident had large photographs
taken of himself purporting to illustrate his tremendous
injury, and these photographs were introduced as "Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7." The bruises mentioned by the
doctor do not appear in these photographs. Since the
plaintiff had large photographs taken of apparently
every scratch he could find on him, it seems fair to
assume that if these bruises had amounted to anything,
he would have had pictures taken of them. However, he
that as it may, the bruises are not shown in the photographs. The doctor further testified that there were
abrasions and lacerations around the ankles and on both
knees and kneecaps. The "wound" on the left ankle is
shown on "Exhibit 5," and "Exhibits 4 and 7" show the
ankle wounds on the right .ankle. The damage to the knees
and the kneecaps is not shown. The doctor testified that
he found only two incisive wounds as opposed to abrasive
wounds on the head of plaintiff (R. 185), and at R. 187
he said that those wounds appeared to be the same
wounds as shown on plaintiff's "Exhibit 2" and also
testified that the plaintiff had a bruise on the upper lid
of his eye. This is shown on plaintiff's "Exhibit 3."
Plaintiff's "Exhibit 6" presumably shows the rest of the
head wounds that he received from what has been characterized in his brief from an unmerciful and brutal
beating. We submit these photographs to the Court for
examination without further comment on the severity
of these wounds.
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The doctor also testified that he thought the plaintiff's nose was broken .and that it should be x-rayed to
determine that, (R. 185). Plaintiff's "Exhibits 3 and 6"
taken a day or two after the incident illustrate his nose.
The appearance of the plaintiff's nose at the trial did
not appear one bit different than it does in these photographs, and the jury must certainly have observed that
fact. The plaintiff testified that his nose was indeed
broken and that it was set at the Veterans Hospital, ·
but he produced no x-rays and no witnesses whatsoever
to testify to or verify this treatment. It would seem that
if his nose had indeed been broken or (deviated) that
this was his most serious physical damage, and if the
proof was available it should have been presented.
However, there was no evidence at .all introduced by the
plaintiff other than the observations of Dr. Decker without benefit of x-rays. Plaintiff did not submit any evidence of medical expenses and claimed no item of special
damages in this connection.
POINT III
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION SHOULD NOT LIE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE, AND IN ANY
EVENT, THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS AT THE TRIAL .CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A
DEFENSE TO ANY SUCH CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT ERRONEOUS.

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence in the trial
(R. 394) defendants made a n1otion to the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's third cause of action for malicious
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prosecution on the ground that the action was not maintainable against the defendant police officers as a matter
of law. At 28 A.L.R. (2d) Page 646 there appears the
recent and latest annotation on the question of the civil
liability of law enforcement officers for malicious prosecution. This is an excellent annotation, and it shows without question that the doctrine of immunity from suit is
being extended to law enforcement officers in the various
states whenever the question directly arises. The annotation discusses at length the pros and cons on the proposition of immunity. The prime case which heads the annotation is White v. Towers, 37 California (2d) 727, 235
Pac. (2d) 209; 28 A.L.R. (2d) 636. This is an excellent
case, and we submit that this is a matter of first impression in this Court, and the Court should follow the California view in accordance with the majority view as set
forth in the annotation. See in particular Sub-paragraph 2 of the annotation at Page 649. The California
Court says, at Page 640 under headnote 3 in the A.L.R.
citation, the following:
"We .are aware of the fact that in thus surrounding peace officers with immunity in cases
of this sort, hardship may result to some individuals. However, experience has shown that the common good is best served by permitting law enforcement officers to perform their assigned tasks
without fear of being called to account in a civil action for alleged malicious prosecution. The doctrine of immunity from liability for allegedly malicious acts has long been established with respect
to numerous public officers. In the early case of
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 20 L. Ed. 646, the
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doctrine was applied to judges of courts of record.
'The rule finds its genesis in the necessary protection of courts in the impartial, uninfluenced discharge of judicial duties.' Phelps v. Dawson,
supra, 8 Cir., 97 F2d 339, 340, 116 ALR 1343. Since
that time it has been recognized that the orderly
administration of the affairs of government necessitates the inclusion of many officials within the
cloak of immunity." (Cites cases)
Respondents submit that this Court should determine
in this case that malicious prosecution suits do not and
should not lie against law enforcement officers. Even in
the event that this Court does not see fit to adopt the
California and the majority rule, the facts and evidence
produced by defendants at the trial clearly established
a defense to any such cause of action, and the court's instructions to the jury on this cause were not in error.
Plaintiff complains of Instruction Nos. 18, 19, and
21. These Instructions are all based on the restatement
on the Law of Torts in the volume containing Sections
504-756 and entitled "Torts Absolute Liability, Deceit,
Defamation, Disparagement, Unjustifiable Litigation,
etc." Instruction No. 18 is supported by the restatement
discussion under Section 657, cmnment (a) and (b) at
Page 393 of said restatement volume. Instruction No. 19
is based on Sections 662 and 665 of the said restatement
volume, and Instruction No. 21 is based on Section 653.
These restatement principles are not in conflict with any
of the Utah cases cited, and the evidence is clear that none
of the defendants except Jacobson ever instituted any
proceedings before anyone, either by way of signing a
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complaint or procuring a complaint or even discussing
the matter with any prosecuting authority. Officer Jacobson took the responsibility for signing complaints. Officer
Jacobson did sign a complaint charging plaintiff with
assault, a complaint charging him with battery (R. 238)
and with the offense of resisting and obstructing (R. 445).
Officer Jacobson did not have anything to do with the
filing of any drunk or vagrancy charges.
The testimony of Mr. Melvin H. Morris, the City
Prosecutor, clearly establishes that Officer J acohson
made a full and fair disclosure of all the facts of the incident, and Prosecutor Morris felt that the complaints
were justified and recommended them (R. 444, 446, 448,
et. seq.). In all events there could have been no possible
prejudice to plaintiff on the malicious prosecution act
because as the Court told the jury in Instruction No. 18
that if the plaintiff actually did commit the offenses
charged against him by the defendants then such a finding would be a cmnplete defense and this, of course, is the
law everywhere and is followed by the Restatement of
Torts, Section 657.
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS IS NOT SUFFICIENT UNDER THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AND IN VIEW OF THE APPLICABLE LAW
APPLIED BY THE COURT BELOW.

78-11-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as
follows:

* * * "In the event judgment in the said
cause shall be against the plaintiff for the pay-
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ment to the defendant of all costs and expenses
that may be awarded against such plaintiff including a reasonable attorney's fee to be fiXed by the
Court."
In the Court's judgment for attorney's fees found
at R. 98, the Court said that in view of the apparent financial circumstances on both sides in the action, the
Court was of the opinion that it should hold the awarding
of attorney's fees to a minimum and that the judgment
should be based upon such consideration rather than on
what attorney's fees should be if the Court considered
the actual, reasonable value of attorney's services rendered in the case. It is submitted that the statute does
not lend itself to this interpretation. It should be construed to the effect that attorney's fees shall be reasonable and just according to what such services were worth.
The evidence on attorney's fees (R. 94-98) shows
that a minimurn time of 26 hours were spent by attorney
for defendants in interviewing witnesses in preparation
for trial and that 45 hours were devoted to researching
the law on the case as it applied to the 3 causes of action
and their intertwining nature. The evidence was that
$25.00 an hour was the usual charge of said attorney
for this work, but in this case $20.00 an hour was all that
was being requested. The evidence further showed that
pre-trial hearing was held and in the opinion of the attorney $75.00 was a reasonable amount for that hearing.
The evidence further showed that the trial of th,e case
consumed four actual days in trial and one full day on
Sunday in the middle of the trial reviewing transcripts
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with the court reporte-r and finishing work on instructions. The recommended average fee schedule of the
County Bar Association states that a reasonable fee for
trial is $200.00 per day. Defendants' attorney requested
only $150.00 a day from the Court. Finally the evidence
of defendants was that in view of the total time spent,
length of the trial, and result achieved, $2700.00 was a
reasonable attorney's fee.
It is submitted that plaintiff's entire lawsuit was completely unjustified, that he was clearly in the wrong, that
he forced the officers into a position where they were required to defend an expensive and lengthy trial, and there
is no basis for giving any special consideration to the
plaintiff in view of the provisions of 78-11-10. It is further submitted that this Court should increase the award
of attorney's fees to $2700.00 and make an additional
award for a reasonable fee to the defendants in connection with this appeal.
POINT V
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO RESERVE OFFICER DOUGLAS.

At the close of the plaintiff's case, Defendant Douglas
(R. 394) moved the Court to grant a judgment of dismissal upon the grounds that said defendant took no part
and engaged in no assault or battery upon the plaintiff,
made no arrest or imprisonment of the plaintiff and participated in no manner which would result in any liability
against him and upon the further ground that it appeared
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that he at all times was acting pursuant to the instructions and directions of a duly authorized police officer
of Salt Lake City who was his superior officer at all times
'
pertinent.
It is submitted to the ·Court that this position is well
taken. Defendant Douglas was a reserve officer in training. He was under the direct supervision and control of
Officer Jacobson who was his superior officer in charge
(R. 402, 410).
Plaintiff maintains that because Douglas was present
and would have been willing to assist the officers that he
was, therefore, aiding and abetting. It is submitted that
in view of the relationship between Douglas and his
superior officer and his duties in connection therewith,
that such a doctrine should not be applicable to defendant
Douglas, and the Court below should have granted the
Motion to Dismiss with respect to him.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff in this case had a full, fair trial. The trial
itself lasted four days. Plaintiff had every opportunity
and indeed took every opportunity to give his side of the
story. The jury chose to accept the officers' version of
the story. The jury had the best opportunity to listen
to and observe the parties and decide where the truth
and the justice of the case lay. They emphatically decided
against the plaintiff, and plaintiff has not suggested any
valid reasons why these defendant police officers should
be forced to go back into Court and submit to additional
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lengthy and expensive litigation. The defendants in this
case were excellent police officers. Under the facts and
circumstancs of this case, it is hard to see what other
course of action they could have pursued other than the
one they did. The plaintiff was determined to make
trouble and give them a bad time. Because of his actions
and conduct, one thing led to another until the entire
situation became quite serious. The offenses committed
by the plaintiff on that night were serious and unjustified.
There was no excuse for the way he acted and for the
the things he did, and he in no way conducted himself
as a decent and responsible citizen on that evening. It
would be a tremendous injustice if this Court were to
disturb the judgment of the Court and jury below and
permit plaintiff to continue this unjustifiable litigation.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR.

Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents
411 Utah Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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